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Hom: Third Party Claims

MORADI-SHALAL v. FIREMAN'S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANIES:
THE OVERRULING OF ROYAL GLOBE
AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies l
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident when her automobile was negligently struck by the insured. Plaintiff filed suit
against the insured for her personal injuries and subsequently
made settlement offers to the insured. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, the insurance company for the insured, did not
reply to plaintiff's settlement offers. Ultimately, plaintiff settled
. with the insured for an amount that was substantially less than
the original settlement offer she had submitted to Fireman's.
Since plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract between the insured and the insurer, she filed a third party action
against Fireman's pursuant to Royal Globe Insurance Company
v. Superior Court of Butte County.2 In 1979, Royal Globe held
that California Insurance Code Section 790.03(h)3 provided third
1. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
2. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
3. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1990):
§ 790.03(h) prohibits the following:
(h) knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing. of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
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party claimants with an implied right of action against insurers
that commit unfair or deceptive practices." This decision served
as the basis for third party bad faith claims against the insurer.
In 1988, Moradi-Shalal overruled Royal Globe and held
that Insurance Code Section 790.03(h) did not create a private
cause of action for a third party claimant against an insurer. G
The court also held that a final judicial determination of liability
must be rendered against the insured before the insurer could be
held liable to third party claims. 6 This Note will analyze the reasoning utilized by the Moradi-Shalal court in overruling Royal
Globe and also analyze its concomitant effects upon the rights of
third party claimants.? Third party claimants' alternatives to a
actions brought by the insureds, when the insureds have made claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
'
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or
broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring
the subsequent submission of formal proof of lOBS forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or
for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
(16) Delaying the payment or provision of hospital, medical, or surgical benefits for
services provided with respect to acquired immune deficiency syndrome or AIDS-related
complex for more than 60 days after the insurer has received a claim for those benefits,
where the delay in claim payment is for the purpose of investigating whether the condition pre-existed the coverage. However, this 60-day period shall not include any time
during which the insurer is awaiting a response for relevant medical information from a
health care provider.
4. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
5. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
6. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
7. This Note shall not review California's bad faith law governing the insurance in-
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Royal" Globe action will then be considered, such as third party
actions by assignment from the insured, and third party private
causes of action against insurers pursuant to California Business
& Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.8
II. MORADI-SHALAL v. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. COS.·
Before Royal Globe, third party claimants could not sue insurers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 9 In Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court decided
that a claimant could sue· an insurer for violations of the Uniform Practices Act (UP A) .10
In Royal Globe the plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries against the defendant's insurer after a slip-and-fall accident, alleging two violations of Insurance Code Section 790.03. 11
The first violation alleged that Royal Globe Insurance Company
did not attempt to settle in good faith with the injured plaintiff.12 The second allegation was that Royal Globe's adjuster had
advised the plaintiff not to consult an attorney.lS Royal Globe
demurred on three grounds. H It argued that the Insurance Commissioner was the sole authority to enforce the UP A; that plaintiff was a third party and therefore lacked standing to sue the
dustry prior to Moradi-Shalal. This topic has already been summarized. See Lippert,
Loosing the Fox Amongst the Chickens: The California Supreme Court Ouerrules Royal
Globe in Moradi-Shalal u. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 22 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1267 (1989);
Gainer, The Ouerruling of Royal Globe: A "Royal Bonanza" for Insurance Companies,
But What Happens Now?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989); Price, Royal Globe Ins. Co.
u. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit against an Insurer by a Third-Party Claimant,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161 (1980).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 is also known as the "Unfair Competition
Statute".
9. Murphy u. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 428 (1976).
10. California codified the UPA. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1990).
11. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 331-32, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45;
plaintiff alleged that defendant Royal Globe Insurance Company had violated subdivision (h)(5) of the act "in that it refused 'to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt,
fair and equitable settlement' of plaintiff's claim although 'liability ... [had] become
reasonably clear,' " and its agent had advised plaintiff not to obtain the services of an
attorney, in violation of subdivision (h)(14). Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; See CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03(h)(14) (West 1972 & Supp. 1990).
14. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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insurer and that a third party claimant cannot sue both the insured and the insurer in the same suit. 111
The California Supreme Court overruled the demurrer, and
validated the rulings of Greenberg u. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States 16 and Shernoff u. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County.17 These decisions held that California
Insurance Code Section 790.09 18 created a private cause of action for a violation of the UP A and that an insurer's duty under
the Act ran to third party claimants as well as insureds. 19 Third
party claimants could sue insurers for any violation of the
UPA.20
The court also analyzed Insurance Code Section 790.03(h),
particularly the phrase, "[k]nowingly committ[ed] or perform[ed] with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice" and held that this section allowed for a statutory bad
faith action against the insurer.21 The California Supreme Court
further held that an injured claimant had an actionable claim
against an insurer who had knowingly committed a single act of
unfair conduct. 22
In Moradi-Shalal, the California Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether an insured's liability had to be judicially
established before a "Royal Globe action" could be brought. The
court also used the case as a means of reviewing the viability of
Royal Globe. 23
The majority began by observing that there was "widespread confusion" surrounding the application of Royal Globe."
In an effort to validate its reexamination of Royal Globe, the
majority cited Cianci u. Superior Court of Contra Costa
15. [d.

16. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
17. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
18. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990).
19. Sherno/f, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 410, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682; Greenberg, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 994, 1000-1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475.
20. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
21. [d. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)
(West 1972 & Supp. 1990).
22. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
23. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 758 P.2d 59-60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
24. [d.
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County2f> for its proposition that scholarly criticism of a decision
justifies reexamination of prior decision, "to determine its continuing viability."28 The Cianci court actually found that reexamination of prior decision is proper where there exists a contrary United States Supreme Court decision and adverse legal
commentary.27 The court's apparent miscasting of the Cianci
opinion may be an indication of its eagerness to attack MoradiShalal. After noting the history and exceptions to the rule of
stare decisis, the court announced its decision to depart from
precedent. 28
In overruling Royal Globe, the Moradi-Shalal majority
cited numerous jurisdictions which "rejected" Royal Globe, adverse commentary, and legislative history as arguments that
Royal Globe should be overruled.

A.

REJECTION OF ROYAL GLOBE BY OTHER STATE COURTS

The court stressed that the UP A was derived from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Unfair
Claims Practices Act (Model Act), adopted by 48 states. 2B The
25. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 921, 710 P.2d 375, 385, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 585 (1985).
26. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
27. Cianci involved the reconsideration of whether the Cartwright Act (This Act is
California's statutory antitrust provision and was codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
16700 et seq.) was applicable to the medical profession. Cianci reasoned that the underlying decision of Willis v. Santa Ana Etc. Hospital Ass'n., 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568,
26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962), should be reconsidered not only because of criticism in legal
commentaries but because of the United States Supreme Court holding in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 173 (1975) and also because of the California Supreme
Court decision in Marin County Board of Realtors v. Pa/sson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d
833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976). Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 921,924,710 P.2d at 385, 387, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 585,587. Based on these developments, inter alia, Cianci reexamined Willis and
concluded that the Cartwright Act was applicable to the medical profession. Cianci, 40
Cal. 3d at 924-25, 710 P.2d at 387-88, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
28. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. According to the majority, stare decisis is "a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed." This policy held true "even though the
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices." Stare
decisis "is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability, and stability in the law
are the major objectives of the legal system". Despite these "general concepts" the majority noted that stare decisis is a "flexible policy". Thus, the court said it could reconsider, and ultimately depart from its own prior precedent in an appropriate situation. id.
29. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. This
Model Act originated in 1947 after Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
subjected the insurance i.ndustry to federal regulation only to the extent that it was not
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court found it significant that seventeen of the nineteen state
courts which considered the issue raised by Royal Globe rejected
California's approach.30
Interestingly, the Moradi-Shalal majority conceded that
state statutes which have rejected a private cause of action did
not contain precisely the same language as sections 790.03 and
790.09. 31 However, the court considered the differences
insignificant. 32
"
Despite acknowledging the principal that out-of-state decisions were not binding on California courts the court found that
the "near unanimity of agreement by [out-of-state] courts in 'rejecting' Royal Globe" brought into question California's minority approach. 33
More significantly, the "rejection"of Royal Globe by out-ofstate courts is a mischaracterization. Rather than "rejecting"
Royal Globe outright, other state courts have chosen not to follow the Royal Globe analysis because of differences with California's statutory language. For example, Morris u. American Family Mutual Insurance Company94 (cited by the majority as the
"typical" approach in other jurisdictions) involved the same legal issue that was decided in Royal Globe. The Morris court
noted the "unique statutory language" in California's version of
the UP A which served as the basis for a third party private
cause of action against the insurer. slI However, the Morris court
decided to dismiss the third party claimant's action by finding
regulated by state law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). To preserve
state regulation of insurance companies, California's legislature passed" the UP A as codified in CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10.
30. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. "The
courts in 17 of these 19 states have refused to recognize such a cause of action, either
expressly rejecting the Royal Globe analysis, or interpreting statutory language similar to
sections 790.03, subdivision (h), and 790.09 in a manner contrary to Royal Globe without
mentioning that case." id.
31. Moradi-Sh"alal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
32. [d. "
33. Justice Mosk's dissent unequivocally refuted the majority's "misplaced" reliance
on other jurisdictions stating, "California courts alone have the responsibility of interpreting the laws adopted by the California legislature, and they cannot be deterred from
that duty by what other states have done or failed to do under laws enacted by their
legislative bodies". [d. at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
34. 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986).
35. [d. at 237 n.6.
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she had no private cause of action against the insurer. The Morris court held that a private person does not have a cause of
action against an insurer under Minnesota's UP A. 36
In Seeman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,37 the
Iowa Supreme Court held" ... that the legislature implicitly intended the insurance commissioner's powers to be the exclusive
means of enforcing ... " the state's UPA.38 Specifically, the
court noted that Iowa's UPA provided that, "[nJo order of the
commissioner under this chapter or order of a court to enforce
the same shall in any way relieve or absolve any person affected
by such order from any liability under any other laws of this
state. (Emphasis added)"39 The Seeman court noted that in California, "[tJhe Royal Globe court found that the elimination of
the word "other" from the California Act indicated that the legislature intended to provide a private cause of action. "40 Thus,
states that have eliminated the word "other" from their version
of the UP A have found that a private cause of action may be
brought against the insurer.
Two general observations .may also undermine thepersuasiveness of the out-of-state decisions cited by the Moradi-Shalal
majority. First, several. of the jurisdictions denying a Royal
Globe action recognize only a contractual basis for bad faith failure to settle within policy limits.· 1 This is significant in that
states that do recognize a Royal Globe action also recognize a
tort basis for insurer bad faith. The intermediate step of tort
liability is a prerequisite to the Royal Globe action, since the
Royal Globe action represents an expansion of tort liability.
Second, only eight of seventeen courts cited by MoradiShalal are state Supreme Courts.42 Moreover, two state supreme
36. Id. at 238.
37. 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982).
38. Id. at 42.
39.Id.
40. Id. citing Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
41. Earth Scientists II. United States Fidelity & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (D.
Kan. 1985); Lawton II. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 613-14, 392 A.2d
576, 580-81; Morris, 386 N.W.2d 233, 237; Swinton II. Chubb & Son, Inc., 283 S.C. 11, 14,
320 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. App. 1984).
42. See White II. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986);
Seeman II. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982); Kranzush II. Badger State
Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wise. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981); Farris II. United States
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courts recognize a Royal Globe action."s This hardly constitutes
a unanimous number of state jurisdictions rejecting Royal
Globe.

B.

"SCHOLARLY CRITICISM" OF ROYAL GLOBE

The court noted seven law review articles that emphasized
the "erroneous" nature of the holding in Royal Globe."" The
court cited "strained interpretation" of the statutory provisions
and the "misreading" of available legislative history as evidence
of the erroneous nature of Royal Globe.""
In citing these articles, the majority failed to mention that
six articles also praised Royal Globe for protecting society from
the unfair practices of insurers."8 Moreover, of the seven articles
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania
Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981); Wilder v. Aetna Life &
. Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309 (1981); Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H.
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978).
43. Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 167 W.Va. 597, 280 S.E.2d 252, 255-58
(1981); Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (1983).
44. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23;
See Meskin, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illustration of
the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 371 (1985); Casey,
Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior
Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917 (1983); Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need
for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 843 (1982); White, Liability Insurers and
Third Party Claimants: The Limits of Duty, 48 u. CHI. L. REV. 125, 148-51 (1981); Note,
Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit against an
Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1176-87 (1980); Tancredi,
Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 777, 791-93 (1980); Van Osdel Manning,
Liability to Third Parties for Economic Insurers: Privity as a Useful Animal, or a Blind
Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 87, 111-18, 125-27 (1981).
45. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The
court listed undesireable social and economic effects of the decisions, such as multiple
litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive settlements, excessive jury awards, and
escalating insurance, legal and other "transaction" costs. id.
46. See Aitken & Abeltin, When Does "The Fat Lady Sing" for Purposes of a Royal
Globe Action? Endless Litigation over What Does or Should Constitute the Resolution
of a Claim, 14 W. ST. U.L. REV. 55 (1986); Beck & Horwitz, Insurer's Day in Court: New
Limits on Royal Globe, 8 L.A. LAW. 31 (1985); Lambert, Tom on Torts, 23 AM. TRIAL
. LAW. A. L. RPTR. 338, 342-43 (1980); Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law: A
Potential Weapon for Consumer Protection, 17 TRIAL 22 (1981); Rose, A Statutory Action for Insurer Bad Faith - The Reasonably Clear Remedy for the Third Party Claimant, 11 PAC. L.J. 945 (1980). One of the articles cited by the Moradi-Shalal majority also
concluded that Royal Globe furthered California public policy. See also Tancredi, Ex-
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cited by the majority, only two claimed Royal Globe had "negative effects";" These two articles failed to support their attacks
on Royal Globe with any factual evidence. 48
The court also relied on the 1980 Report of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.) and found
that the report was "instructive" regarding the intent of the
framers. 49 The court failed to point out, however, that the
N.A.I.C. is an organization of state officials who supervise the
insurance industry and promote uniformity of legislation and
regulation affecting insurance to protect the interests of policyholders. IIO Moreover, since California's legislature adopted a
modified version of the Model Act, the intent of the Model Act's
framers is irrelevant to interpreting California's UP A. The court
should have considered the intent of the California legislators
who drafted and passed the UP A.
C.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF INSURANCE CODE SECTION

790.03

The Moradi-Shalal majority considered "additional" legislative history allegedly "overlooked" by the Royal Globe court. 111
The court examined the state's Legislative Analyst's Reportll2
and the Legislative Counsel's Digest,IIS which both described
Section 790.03 as calling for "administrative enforcement".114
tending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company

v. Superior Court, supra, note 44.

47. Tancredi, Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe
Insurance Company v. Superior Court, supra, note 44; Casey, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 917, 930-39 (1983).
48. One author delineated the problems with the Royal Globe decision, did not support his criticism of Royal Globe with factual evidence, and then concluded his article by
proposing solutions to these problems. Casey, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards
in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 917, 939-44
(1983).
49. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The
court said: "In the words of the 1980 N.A.I.C. report, 'The 1971 Model Act does not
contain an individual right of action provision .. .' .. id.
50. See 1 Encyclopedia of Associations 521-22 (M. Burek, K. Koek, and A. NovalIo,
24th ed. 1990).
51. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
. 52. Pierson, Analysis of Assembly Bill 459 (Apr. 28, 1972).
53. Legislative Counsel's Digest to A.B. 459 (1972).
54. The Insurance Commissioner may issue a cease and desist order to insurance
companies that are in violation of California's UP A.
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Since neither the Legislative Analyst nor the Legislative Counsel
said that the new act created a private right of action, the
Moradi-Shalal court interpreted this as a strong indication that
the Legislature never intended to create such a right of action. IiIi
This characterization by the court was misleading at best, since .
the Royal Globe court did consider both the Report and the Digest. However, the Royal Globe court found these sources to be
too remote or too generalized to be of any use in interpreting
Section 790.03. li8
The Moradi-Shalal majority was also guided by "subsequent legislative history" Senate Bill No. 483 117 which provided
that no civil liability would be imposed on any insurer. 1I8 The
court said that the bill's intent was to overturn Royal Globe, but
did not find that the failure of the bill to reach the Assembly
indicated that the movement to overturn Royal Globe lacked
support. IIS The court instead emphasized that the Senate agreed
that Royal Globe should be abrogated. 80
Finally, the Moradi-Shalal court addressed the argument
that the Legislature's 1983 modification of Section 790.03 without changing subdivision (h) or addressing the Royal Globe issue
was, in effect, a "silent Legislative approval" of the Royal Globe
decision. 81
Cianci v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Count y 82 provided the general rule that if the Legislature fails to change a
law in a specific area, when the "general subject" is before it and
other changes are made, the legislative intent is to leave the law
as it is, in the area not amended. 83 The Moradi-Shalal majority
expanded upon this general rule. The court cited Cianci for the
proposition that "something more than mere silence should be
required before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of
55. Moradi·Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
56. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 887, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
57. S.B. 483, Journal of the Senate, Legislature of the State of California, Reg. Sess.,
Vol. 2, 3068-71 (1979).
58. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
59. Id. This bill "stalled" in the Ways and Means Committee. id.
60.Id.
6l. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
62. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
63. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 923, 710 P.2d at 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
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implied legislation ... "G4 Under the majority's reasoning, in order for a statute to be "upheld" the Legislature should give direct approval of all provisions left intact during the process of
statute modification. Gli
D.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ROYAL GLOBE

The court delineated the "negative impact" of Royal Globe
by pointing out that Royal Globe promoted multiple litigation. GG
The court found that Royal Globe encourages two lawsuits by
the injured claimant; an initial suit against the insured, followed
by a suit against the insurer for bad faith refusal to settle. 67
Royal Globe also tended to encourage "unwarranted" settlement
demands by claimants and coerced inflated settlements by insurers trying to avoid a bad faith action. GS However, these arguments are questionable since a Royal Globe action will only be
brought if an insurer violates any of the provisions as set forth
in the UPA. Moreover, it is disengenous to imply that injured
claimants will not settle in good faith with an insurer for the
tactical advantage of a subsequent Royal Globe action. It is the
insurer who holds the "upper hand" in settlement negotiations
since the claimant is often in immediate need of capital to pay
for medical costs as well as recover lost wages.

If the injured claimant does use the original settlement as a
"tactic" to bring a Royal Globe action and collect a "windfall"
the insurer can point this out to the court. If the argument is
persuasive, then the court will find for the insurer. Furthermore,
if the court determines that the Royal Globe action was frivolous, the court could award the insurer sanctions. G9
Another feared consequence of Royal Globe was that it
would cause insurance costs to rise since the insurer would make
64. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at·124.
65. As Justice Mosk put it "the majority's [reasoning] stands the concept of legislative intent on its head". Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 136.
66. [d. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
67. [d.
68. [d.

69 .. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Under § 128.5
"[e]very trial court may order a party ... to pay any reasonable expenses ... incurred
by another party as a result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous . . ." id.
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greater expenditures to pay the costs of coerced settlements, excessive jury awards, and higher attorney fees. 70 However, neither
the court nor the legal commentaries cited any factual evidence
in support of these claims.
The court also found that Royal Globe created a conflict of
interest since the insurer had a direct duty to its insured as well
as to third party claimants. 71 This "conflict of interest", meant
that the settlement process could be disrupted and the insured
disadvantaged. 72 Unfortunately, this argument ignores the wellestablished practice in the insurance industry of providing independent counsel where a potential conflict of interest is created. 73 By providing independent counsel an insurer's duty to
both the insured and the third party claimant is preserved. 74

E.

DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING THE ROYAL GLOBE DECISION

The court observed that approximately 25 other Royal
Globe cases were awaiting review, and that "many" had reached
"conflicting conclusions" in the courts of appeal,711 The court
said this evidenced "analytical difficulties" which the lower
70. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
71. Id. at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
72.Id.
73. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
371, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (1984). In Cumis, the court considered a situation where an
insurer is required to pay for independent counsel for an insured "when the insurer provides its own counsel but reserves its right to noncoverage at a later date. [The court]
conclude[d] under these circumstances there is a conflict of interest between the insurer
and the insured, and therefore the insured has a right to independent counsel paid for by
the insurer." id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1974
& Supp. 1990). § 2860 provides, "If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty
to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the
part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the insured ... " id.
74. The court also asserted that Royal Globe left several unanswered questions regarding the practicality of actions against insurers pursuant to CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03.
The court found that Royal Globe failed to define a "bad faith" refusal to abide by §
790.03, specify the stage at which the insurer's duty to settle arises, discuss whether
mutual good faith obligations are imposed on third party claimants, and failed to address
"a host of constitutional problems such as vagueness, the right to a jury trial, and the
right to contract." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
125. With respect to these "unanswered questions" allegedly created by Royal Globe, the
court did not address these questions other than simply mentioning them. By not addressing them at all, the court undermined their alleged import.
75. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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courts were having in interpreting Royal Globe. 76
The majority' stated that one analytical problem which
lower courts had in interpreting Royal Globe was that a third
party claimant must wait until the "conclusion" of the action
against the insured before suing the insurer for breach of Section 790.03(h).77 Lower courts had difficulty in determining
whether a settlement can constitute such a "conclusion" for a
Royal Globe suit, or whether a prior judicial determination of
the insurer's liability is required. 78
The Moradi-Shalal court held that settlement is an insufficient conclusion of the underlying action and ruled that there
must be a "conclusive judicial determination" of the insured's
liability before the third party can succeed in an action against
the insurer under Section 790.03. 79 The court recalled that in
Royal Globe a joint lawsuit agaInst both the insured for negligence and the insurer for violating its duties under Section
790.03(h) would be improper. 8o By holding that a determination
of the insured's liability to a third party claimant was a prerequisite to a recovery in a Royal Globe action, the court adopted
the reasoning of Williams v. Transport Indemnity Company81
and Heninger v. Foremost Insurance Company.82
The Moradi-Shalal. court next. turned to the specific issue of
76. Id ..
77. Id.
78.Id.
79. Id. at 305-306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
80. Id. at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. The court stated three reasons for this conclusion. First, a joint trial would violate CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 which
provides that evidence that an alleged tortfeasor is insured is inadmissible to prove the
insured's negligence or wrongdoing. The purpose of § 1155 is to prevent the prejudicial
use of such evidence during an action against an insured. id. Second, a joint trial would
hamper the defense of the insured on the issue of liability. id. Third, an injured party's
damages resulting from an insurer's violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 709.03(h)(5) and
(h)(14) would be best determined after the conclusion of the action by the third party
claimant against the insured. id.
81. 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984). In Williams, the court held that
if the insured is not liable to the claimant, then the insurer is also not liable on the
claipl. id. at 960, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
82. 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303' (1983). The Heninger court relied on
Williams, concluding that CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 did not require an insurer to payor
settle every claim presented by a third party claimant without regard to whether its
insured is liable on the underlying claim. Heninger, 175 Cal. App. 3d 835, 221 Cal. Rptr.
at 306.
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defining a "concluded action" for a Royal Globe action. 83 The
court was interested in whether a settlement met this requirement. 84 The court noted that some courts of appeal followed
Doser u. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company,81S Nationwide
Insurance Company v. Superior Court,88 Williams v. Transport
Indemnity Company,87 and Heninger v. Foremost Insurance
Company,SS which collectively hold that a viable cause of action
for an alleged violation of [section 790.03(h)] may not be filed
until the twin requirements of conclusion of the dispute between
the injured party and the insured and a final determination of
the insured's liability are alleged. 89
The court of appeal in Moradi-Shalal departed from the.
Nationwide analysis and instead adopted an alternative analysis. 90 Under this analysis the court of appeal relied upon Rodriquez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company91 and concluded
that plaintiff could maintain a Section 790.03 action following a
83. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305-306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
84.Id.
85. 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 CaJ. Rptr. 115 (1980). Doser was the first opinion after
Royal Globe to refer to "determination of liability" as a condition precedent to a CAL.
INS. CODE § 790.03 cause of action.
86. 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982).
87. 157 CaJ. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984).
88. 175 CaJ. App. 3d 830, 221 CaJ. Rptr. 303 (1985).
89. In Doser, the court held that an insured's cause of action for bad faith of the
insurer could not arise until the insured incurred a binding judgment in excess of the
policy limit. Doser, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 162 CaJ. Rptr. at 119-20.
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 CaJ. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1982) cited Doser. The Nationwide court held that because the judgment against the
insured could be reversed on appeal and the case retried, Royal Globe's concerns regard·
ing discovery and determination of damages were fully applicable. Thus, the court con·
cluded that Royal Globe's language about determination of liability and conclusion of
the action "could only have had reference to a final determination and conclusion, a final.
judgment." Nationwide, 128 CaJ. App. 3d at 714, 180 CaJ. Rptr. at 466.
After Nationwide, the court in Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co., 157 CaJ. App.
3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984) stated that a CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 action was subject
to a condition precedent. Liability of the insured must be finally determined prior to the
commencement of a suit against the insurer. Williams, 157 CaJ. App. 3d at 962, 203 CaJ.
Rptr. at 873.
In Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 CaJ. Rptr. 303 (1985)
the court cited Nationwide and Williams and concluded that a Royal Globe action could
not be brought unless the twin requirements of conclusion of the dispute between the
injured party and the insured and a final· determination of the insured's liability were
alleged. Heninger, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
90. Moradi·Shalal, 46 CaJ. 3d at 309-310, 758 P.2d at 72, 250 CaJ. Rptr. at 130.
91. 142 CaJ. App. 3d 46, 190 CaJ. Rptr. 705 (1983).
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settlement and a dismissal with prejudice of the underlying
claim. 92
The Moradi-Shalal majority found the court of appeal's reliance on Rodriguez to be "misplaced" since there was no admission of liability by defendant. 93 The majority rejected this approach and instead adopted the reasoning of Nationwide for
four reasons. 9•
First, allowing the claimant to sue the insurer after settling
the underlying claim would mean the establishment of the insured's liability within the Royal Globe' action itself.911 The majority was apprehensive of the evidentiary problem this would
cause, since evidence of insurance would make up an essential
part of the case and would have an obvious potential to
prejudice the jury's determination of. the insured's liability.96
92. Id. The court of appeal believed that the obvious purpose of the Royal Globe
requirement of a "conclusion" of the underlying action was to avoid prejudicing the defense of the insured in the underlying case. In addition, this requirement could be used
to ascertain the amount of the damages, suffered by the injured plaintiff. id. This requirement should not shield an errant insurer from the consequences of its tortious
breach of its duties to an injured claimant. id.
The Moradi-Shalal majority noted that the court of appeal s~emed confused about
the requirements for a Royal Globe action. The court of appeal stated that "the language
in Royal Globe 'until the liability of the insured is first determined' was not necessary to
and did not serve the purpose of determining any of the facts or issues of that case which
deferred the determination of the Section 790.03 action until after the conclusion of the
underlying action." id. Later, the court of appeal demonstrated its inconsistency by stating "we must next determine whether the insured's liability has been conclusively established". id. The court of appeal said such a determination was a prerequisite to bringing
an unfair practice bad faith action against the insurer. id.
In support of its holding the court of appeal relied upon Rodriguez v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983). In Rodriguez, the court
held that there was a proper Royal Globe action where the insured admitted liability. id.
at 53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 709. Such an admission made a prior judgment determining'
liability unnecessary. id.
Rodriguez is consistent with Afuso v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal.
App. 3d 859,215 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1985) and Vega v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal.
App. 3d 922, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1985). In Afuso, the court held that plaintiff met the
minimum requirements for a Royal Globe action by pleading a settlement and release.
Afuso, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 493. In Vega, the same court of appeal
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the insurer on a § 790.03 claim when the claimant had settled the underlying claim. Vega, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 926, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
595.
93. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 310, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
94. Id. at 311, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
95.Id.
96. Id. In Royal Globe the California Supreme Court held that CAL.
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A second problem would involve the difficulty in preventing
the jury from considering the settlement as evidence that the
insured was liable. 97 The court noted that California Evidence
Code Section 115298 prohibited the admission of such evidence
to prove the settling party's liability on the settled claim. 99
Third, establishing the insured's actual liability after settlement would involve litigation of the very issue that the insured
and the insurer attempted to avoid litigating. loo By allowing a
post settlement Royal Globe suit, the third party claimant would
obtain a windfall. lol Because of the potential windfall to the injured party, the court was suspicious that the insurer might not
discharge its duties to the insured in an impartial manner. 102
Finally, the majority reasoned that a settlement combined
with a dismissal with prejudice legally precluded litigating the
liability of the insured. lOS In effect, a settlement served the purpose of a final conclusion as to the underlying action for liability
and damage claims. 104
A fair reading of the Royal Globe opinion could show that
the Royal Globe majority did not necessarily require a final judicial determination of the underlying action between the insured
and the third party claimant as a condition precedent for a third
1155 prohibits a third party claimant from suing both the insurer (under CAL.

INS.

CODE

§ 790.03) and the insured (on the underlying claim) in the same lawsuit. § 1155 prohibits

the introduction of evidence that a person was insured for the harm caused. Such evidence could not be used to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.
97. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (WEST 1966 & SUPP. 1990).
99. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132. See
also Zalta v. Billips, 81 Cal. App. 3d 183, 190, 144 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
100. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132; the
court believed that allowing for post settlement litigation would penalize the insurer for
choosing to settle a claim by subjecting the insurer to subsequent litigation on the liability issue already settled.
101. Id. A third party plaintiff could settle and retain the benefits of the settlement.
He could then sue the insurer for additional compensation if the insurer failed to award
an adequate settlement on the underlying claim.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 311-12,758 P.2d at 74,250 Cal. Rptr. at 132; See Dalta v. Staub, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 613, 621, 343 P.2d 977 (1959); Rodriguez, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 54, 190 Cal. Rptr.
705; A.J. Industries, Inc. v. Ver Halen, 75 Cal. App. 3d 751, 759, 142 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388
(1977); County of Los Angeles v. Law Building Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 848, 853-55, 62
Cal. Rptr. 542 (1967).
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party to sue the insurer. 1011 When the Royal Globe majority
stated that a third party action could be brought once "liability
of the insured is first determined",I°6 it was not eliciting additional conditions for filing the action. Arguably, under Royal
Globe, a third party action against an insurer could first be filed
when the action between the insured and the third party was
"concluded".l07 Trial between the third party and the insurer
could not commence until the liability of the insured was first
determined. lOB This rationale is supported by Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company,I°9 Afuso v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty CompanY,110 and Vega v. Western Employers Insuran.ce Company.lll

Furthermore, the Rodriguez court articulated a more compelling policy than elicited by Moradi-Shalal for not requiring a
final judgment as a prerequisite to a Royal Globe action. Rodriguez recognized the "possibility of abuse by insurance companies who might entice a settlement by unfair practices, then seek
to hide behind the cloak of that settlement. "112
Most importantly, the California Supreme Court said in
Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group,llS "the more plausible interpretation of [section 790.03], subdivision (h)(5) is that the provision was intended to apply only to prejudgment conduct. "114
This focus on the insurer's prejudgment conduct together with
Royal Globe's goal of prohibiting unfair practices and encouraging good faith settlementsllll logically points to the conclusion
that no prior judgment against the insured ought to be required
of an injured claimant as a condition precedent for a Royal
Globe suit.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Royal Globe, 2~ Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
[d. at 891-92, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
[d.

[d.
142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 55, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705, 710 (1983).
169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 863, 215 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1985).
170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 926, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1985).
Rodriguez, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
41 Cal. 3d 782, 718. P.2d 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
Coleman, 41 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 718 P.2d at 85,226 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
Abeltin & Aitken, supra, note 46.
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RETROACTIVITY OF THE MORADI-SHALAL DECISION

In overruling Royal Globe, the Moradi-Shalal majority said
its decision would not apply retrospectively.116 As to all Royal
Globe actions filed before Moradi-Shalal, the court required a
prior determination of liability.ll7
III. THE DISSENT
Justice Mosk stated that the issues on review had not been
addressed,118 and that the court chose to eliminate plaintiff's
cause of action entirely.119 Mosk declared that an objective reading of Section 790.03 to be prima facie evidence that the legislature intended the statute to provide redress for insureds as well
as third party claimants. 12o He noted that a violation of the UP A
took place even where only a single deceptive act could be
proved,121 and section 790.03(h) created two methods by which
the prohibited acts may be shown. 122
.
Justice Mosk did not believe that the majority's warning to
the insurance industry not to commit the unfair practices prohibited by the Insurance Code woul<,l be a significant deterrent
to unfair practices. 123 Mosk further stated that "in 29 years
there did not exist a single case where the Insurance Commissioner has disciplined an insurance carrier for violations of the
insurance code. "124
116. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
117. [d. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
118. [d. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
119. Id. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
120. Id. at 314-16, 758 P.2d at 75-76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
121. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 76-77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135; a
violation of the subdivision occurs if the prohibited acts are knowingly committed on one
occasion or if knowledge cannot be established, then it will suffice if the acts are performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice. See Sherwood &
Packer, Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7 PAC. L.J. 237, 484 (1976).
122. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Mosk
believed that statutory language regarding repetition of misconduct may be relevant to
the Insurance Commissioner to issue a cease and desist order but such language is irrelevant to an aggrieved private litigant who can show that the insurer acted deliberately.
See Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 653, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979).
123. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316-17, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
124. Id. at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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Mosk then turned to the Legislature's failure to enact bills
that would have overruled Royal Globe.l211 Mosk believed this
failure represented an affirmative legislative approval of Royal
Globe. 128 Moreover, in 1983 the Legislature amended section
790.03 without addressing or changing subdivision (h) or the
Royal Globe decision.127 Mosk believed that such non-action by
the Legislature indicated an intent to leave the law
undisturbed. 128
Mosk refuted the majority's argument that Royal Globe was
an "aberration" in that he found previous cases held that the
Insurance Code authorized action by claimants and not exclusively by the state's administrative agency.129 Mosk noted
Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company130 where
the court stated that "[t]he decision in Royal Globe was thus
merely a change in remedy of enforcing the duty of an insurer."131 Moreover, contrary to the majority's findings Mosk
125. ·Id. at 317·18, 758 P.2d 77·78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135·36. The first such bill was
Senate Bill No. 483 (1979 Reg. Sess.). This bill passed the Senate and was referred to the
Assembly. Ultimately, the bill "died" in the Assembly. id.
126. Moradi·Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136, citing
People u. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393, 396 (1954).
127. MO'radi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
128. Id. See Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 754, 758 (1975); Bailey u. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 977-78 n.10, 568 P.2d
394, 398 n.10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669, 673 n.10 (1977); People u. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 647
n.19, 685 P.2d 52, 57 n.19, 205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 n.19 (1984).
129. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318-19, 758 P.2d at 78-79,250 Cal. Rptr. at 13637; The first case was Greenberg u. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 34 Cal. App. 3d
994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). In Greenberg, the court held that "Section 790.09 thus
contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental action
against the insurer for violation of the Insurance Code. The fair construction is that the
person to whom civil liability runs may enforce [the statute] by an appropriate action."
Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The Greenberg court stated
that any other construction would overturn Crisci u. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) by implication. id. at 1001 n.5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475
n.5.
Second, in Shernoff u. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1975) the court said that the Insurance Commissioner's disciplinary authority is limited
to restrain against future illegal conduct. The court relied on § 790.09 which clearly
states that no cease and desist order absolves a person from civii liability. id. at 409, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 682.
The third case was Homestead Supplies, Inc. u. Executiue Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal.
App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978). In Homestead, the court held that the Insurance
Code is directed at insurers, not insureds. In fact, one of the statutory purposes is to
protect the public. id. at 992, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
130. 146 Cal. App. 3d 926, 194 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
131. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137, citing
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found that courts of appeal did not have difficulty in applying

Royal Globe. ls2

Justice Mosk concluded in his dissent that by overruling
Royal Globe the Moradi-Shalal majority was also overruling by
implication Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States/ss Shernoff v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County/s" and Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Insurance Company.ISII

IV. THE EFFECT OF MORADI-SHALAL AND A THIRD
PARTY CLAIMANT'S ALTERNATIVES TO A ROYAL
GLOBE ACTION
The Moradi-Shalal decision eliminated a third party bad
faith action against the insurer based upon the California Insurance Code and restored the bad faith principles that prevailed
prior to Royal Globe. ls6
A.

THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH ACTIONS BY ASSIGNMENT

As a result of the Moradi-Shalal decision, bad faith actions
may still be maintained by the insured against the insurer for
breach of the good faith covenant that is implied in all insurance
contracts. However, the third party claimant cannot assert a
cause of action for an alleged breach of the implied covenant
since the covenant arises from the insurance contract to which
the claimant is not a party.137
Schlauch, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 934, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
132. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982);
Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985); Sych v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 173 Cal. App. 3d 321, 220 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1985); Vega
v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1985); Afuso v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 215 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1985);
Smith v. Interinsurance Exchange, 167 Cal. App. 3d 301, 213 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1985);
Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984);
Trujillo v. Yosemite-Great Falls Ins. Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 26, 200 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1984);
Rodriquez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983).
133. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
134. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
135. 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978).
136. L.A. Daily J. Rpt., Nov. 18, 1988, at 12, col. 2.
137. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588,132 Cal.
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Despite the Moradi-Shcilal decision, it should be noted that
an insured's claim for economic damages resulting from a breach
of the implied covenant is assignable to a third party. Under
such an assignment, a third party can maintain a bad faith action against the liability insurer. 138

B.

THE UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUTE:

A

NEW STATUTORY BASIS

FOR A THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT TO SUE AN INSURER FOR BAD FAITH

In the 1988 general election, Californians passed Proposition 103 and California Insurance Code Section 1861.03(a) to
offset the victory for the insurance industry, inter alia, in
Moradi-Shalal. 139 The new law provides that insurance companies will be subject to the state laws governing unfair competition in trade practices, civil rights, and state antitrust laws and
that the insurance industry shall now be subject to the iaws applicable to any business. Ho Since California Insurance Code Section 790.03 applies exclusively to the "business of insurance", it
seems improbable that the quoted language could reasonably be
interpreted to resurrect a private Royal Globe cause of action. H1
Proposition 103 also makes insurers expressly subject to the
numerous and complex provisions of the· state's unfair business
practices laws. 142 The purpose of the unfair business trade practice statutes is to "safeguard the public against the creation or
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive,
fraudulent, and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. 1Il43 California courts
interpret "unfair competition" to mean any unfair business
Rptr. 424, 428 (1976).
138. Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 241, 636 P. 2d 32, 45, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 343, 356 (1981); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 801, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 408-409 (1964).
139. See California Ballot Pamphlet, analysis of Prop. 103 by Legislative Analyst, as
presented to voters, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8, 1988, at 98, 140.
140. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990).
141. L.A. Daily J. Rpt., Dec. 16, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Proposition 100, which would
have explicitly revived private Royal Globe claims, was defeated at the polls. id.
142. Parts 2 and 3, commencing with CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 16600, Div. 7 (West
1987 & Supp. 1990).
143. CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 17001 (West 1987).
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practice prohibited by law.144
Recently, in Beatty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company14l'> the California Court of Appeal interpreted
the state's prohibition on unfair competition to include unfair
business practices by the insurance industry. In Beatty, the
court of appeal held that California Business and Professions
Code Section 17200 et seq. could serve as a proper basis for remedying the unfair practices of insurers. 148 The court noted that
the adoption of the unfair competition statute by the Legislature reflected an expansion of common-law notions of unfair
competition. "[T]he Legislature, by adopting [Civil Code]
[S]ection 3369, broadened the scope of legal protection against
wrongful business practices generally, and in so doing extended
to the entire consuming public the protection once afforded only
to business competitors."147
The court pointed out that this ruling was not in conflict
with Moradi-Shalal since that decision merely eliminated a private cause of action pursuant to Insurance Code Section
790.03. 148 In fact, Moradi-Shalal recognized the continued validity of "administrative remedies" and "appropriate common law
actions" against insurers. l49
Section 17200 et seq. has long been interpreted as a consumer protection statute.lIIO Its purpose was to ferret out unfair
business practices wherever they might occur and in whatever
guise human ingenuity can devise. llli Moreover, the statute's
standing provision, section 17204 also evinces the Legislature's
intention that the statute be applicable to all businesses including the insurance industry.11l2
144. People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979).
145. 213 Cal. App. 3d 379, 262 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1989).
146. Id. at 385, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
147. Beatty, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82, citing Barquis v.
Merchants Collection Ass'n., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 109,496 P.2d 817, 827-28, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745,
755-56 (1972). Until 1977, the Unfair Competition Statute was located in CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3369, at which time it was substantially re-enacted in its present form and location in
the Business and Professions Code.
148. Beatty, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 383, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
151. Id. at 387, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
152. Id. at 384, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 82.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss2/5

22

Hom: Third Party Claims

1990]

THIRD PARTY CLAIMS

367

As stated in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association,lISs
"[s]ection [17200 et seq.] demonstrates a clear design to protect
consumers as well as. . . any member of the public to sue on his
own behalf or on behalf of the public generally. If the legislat.ure
had been solely concerned with protection against . . . unfair
competitive advantage, it would certainly have more narrowly
circumscribed the class of persons permitted to institute such
actions."u4 Despite this new theory under which third party
claimants can sue an insurer for unfair practices it must be
pointed out that Section 17200 et seq. contains no provision for
damages for violation of any of its provisions. Section 17200 et
seq. merely provides a third party claimant with injunctive relief
as a remedy for an insurer's bad faith acts.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it appears that the insurance industry
achieved a great victory when the California Supreme Court
overruled Royal Globe. The benefits, however, may be shortlived.
The reasoning utilized by the Moradi-Shalal majority contains the seeds for its own destruction. To arrive at its proffered
result, the California Supreme Court bent the principle of. stare
decisis to such an extreme that in its present "watered-down"
form, the Moradi-Shalal decision, itself could conceivably be
swept away in the same manner as Royal Globe. Under MoradiShalal's analysis any prior court decision may be "properly" reconsidered and overruled where there exists contrary out-ofstate decisions and legal commentary critical of the underlying
court decision.
In addition, state legislative action or a public referendum
that is more comprehensive than Proposition 103, could create a
new statutory basis for a Royal Globe action. In the alternative,
legislative action or a public referendum could also be used. to
add some "teeth" (by providing a damages provision) to the
cause of action available to third party claimants under Califor153. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 406 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
154. Barquis, 7 Cal. 3d at 110-11 n.11, 496 P.2d 828-29 n.11, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57
n.ll.
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nia's Unfair Competition Statute. Only in this way can a third
party claimant be given protection from the insurer's potential
unfair practices.
Randolph Stevenson Hom*

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991.
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